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Chapter 23: The Natural Environment 
 
Introduction  
Introductory box  Undersea politics  PHOTO 
 
 
In 2009 the government of the Maldive Islands held a cabinet meeting below the sea at 
which ministers donned sub aqua swimming gear and discused policy around a submerged 
cabinet table. This was, of course, a publicity stunt  to highlight concerns at rising sea 
levels rather than an act of political necessity since the low lying islands had yet to be 
reduced to the status of sand banks in the Indian Ocean. However, this remains a likely 
future scenario. The country’s highest point is just 2.4 meters above current sea level and 
80% of the archipelago lies below 1 metre. Forecasts of the United Nations’ International 
Panel on Climate change suggest a sea level rise of between 25 and 58 centimetres by the 
end of the present century. It is widely accepted that this is an eventuality which could be 
averted by global political action to limit global warming (which is melting the world’s 
glaciers and ice sheets and so raising global sea levels) but the prospects of this happening 
seem- by 2010- to be remote. In other parts of the world the impacts of global warming 
appear less stark and the incentives to enact costly measures to limit this, such as curbing 
carbon dioxide emissions from vehicles and industry, less obvious leading to the 
intransigence which prompted the Maldive government’s stunt. The government, indeed, 
seem to recognize that getting the world to act to save their country- and other low lying 
territories- is likely to be in vain and have simultaneously been pursuing a political ‘Plan 
B’; buying a new homeland in India or Sri Lanka for their entire 300,000 population to 
relocate to as environmental refugees.  
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This incident highlights why environmental issues tend to polarize opinion in 
International Relations. To some, issues like global warming, overpopulation and 
ozone depletion are the most pressing of all items on the international political 
agenda, since they imperil all human and other life forms on earth. To others such 
issues are minor concerns relative to the threats posed by war and terrorism and, 
possibly, do not represent any sort of threat at all. 
 
This chapter will explore how and why environmental issues have become more 
prominent in International Relations but still tend not to be afforded the same level of 
political significance at the global level as military or economic matters. 
 
In this chapter will learn about the following: 
•  The emergence of environmental politics and political ecology. 
• How and why environmental politics has globalized. 
• Why achieving global consensus for political action on environmental issues 
has proved difficult.  
• How, in spite of such difficulties, a consensus on global political action on the 
environment has emerged, persisted and survived US-led resistance. 
 
 
The Emergence of Political Ecology 
 
Issues relating to the natural environment are comparatively ‘new’ to politics and 
have only been on the agenda of international relations since the late 1960s. That is 
not to say, however, that problems of environmental change are in any way new. The 
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extinction of certain animal species due to human recklessness and the decline of 
woodland areas through over-exploitation are centuries old phenomena. The Dodo, 
Moa, and Passenger Pigeon, for example, were hunted to extinction before the 20th 
Century. Other notable changes to the natural environment have occurred entirely 
independent of human action. The ‘Cretaceous / Tertiary Impact’, caused by either a 
comet or an asteroid, created the 250km wide Chicxulub crater in the Gulf of Mexico, 
widely held as responsible for the extinction of the dinosaurs and other life forms long 
before the dawn of humanity. In addition, the temperature of the earth has periodically 
naturally warmed and cooled throughout human and pre-human history with various 










































Box 23.1  timeline of environmental politics 
 
Emergence of the science of ecology 
1864  US scientist George Perkins Marsh’s Man and Nature released-  
  arguably the first book to prove human activities can harm the  
  environment. 
1866  German biologist Ernst Haeckel coins the term ecology. 
 
Emergence of conservation policies 
1872  Yellowstone National Park, US becomes world’s first major  
   nature conservation scheme.  
1889  Royal Society for the Protection of Birds in Great Britain becomes  
  world’s first conservation pressure group. 
1889  First ever international policy on non-human life form agreed-  
  combating the spread of the disease phylloxera in wine grapes.  
1892  Sierra Club conservation pressure group founded in the US. 
1902  Convention on the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture becomes 
  the first international policy on animal conservation.  
1946  International Whaling Commission established. 
1948  International Union for the Preservation of Nature founded by  
  Pressure Groups and the UN (later became International Union for  
  the Conservation of Nature). 
 
Emergence of Political Ecology 
1962  US marine biologist Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring quickly  
  prompts political action in the US and much of the West to restrict  
  the use of industrial chemicals because of their effects on wildlife.  
1967  Torey Canyon oil tanker disaster.  
 
Development of International Environmental Policy 
1968  UN Biosphere Conference 
1969  UN Population Fund established. 
1972  UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. 
1973  UN Conference on the Law of the Sea initiates process leading to  
  ratification of the UN Convention in 1994. 
1973  First International Convention for the Protection of Pollution from  
  Ships (MARPOL). 
1973  Convention on the Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) 
1974  Fist UN Population Conference in Bucharest. 
1979  Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) agreement. 
1985  Vienna Convention on Protection of the Ozone Layer. 
1987  Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention. 
1987  World Commission on Environment & Development set up by UN. 
1992  UN Conference on the Environment & Development (Rio Earth  
  Summit) 
1992  International Framework Convention on Climate Change (IFCCC) 
1993  UN Convention on Biological Diversity 
1994  Convention to Combat Desertification 
1997  Kyoto Protocol to the IFCCC 
2001  Stockholm Conference on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
2002  UN’s World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. 
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Conservation policies, driven by the aesthetics of loving the countryside or 
nationalism of preserving rural lifestyles, permeated the domestic politics of some 
developed countries in the early twentieth century (including, even, the Nazisi). 
However, the emergence of truly environmental rather than human-focussed politics- 
that is ecocentric rather than anthropocentric policies- did not occur until around a 
century after the birth of the science of ecology in the 1960s.  The phylloxera and bird 
protection policies of 1889 and 1902 in box 23.1 dealt with a non-human species but 
for purely human (economic) interests  A major factor in this development was the 
publication of Rachel Carson's hugely influential pollution polemic Silent Spring in 
1962. Silent Spring most notably highlighted the polluting effects of the insecticide 
dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) on wild animals, vegetation and rivers. The 
book quickly influenced US policy with the government enacting legislation restricting 




Biodiversity first emerged as a term as recently as 1986, during a ‘National Forum on 
Biodiversity in the US’, but the idea of seeking to maintain the variety of life forms on 
Earth pre-dates the age of international policy on environment and even the emergence 
of political ecology that followed in the wake of Silent Spring. The RSPB were 
prompted into action in the 19th Century through fears that the grebe was in danger of 
becoming extinct due to the fashion of using its feathers for hats. Grebes and other 
animals are, of course, not confined by state frontiers and so, after the Second World 
War, the RSPB, Sierra Club and other groups came to orientate their campaigns through 
the United Nations. Several groups, principally from the UK and US, worked with the 
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newly established United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) to found the body that became The International Union for the Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN) and this became a focus of international information exchange on 
endangered species, based on the compilation of ‘Red Lists’ of flora and fauna close to 
extinction throughout the world (Adams 2004: 43-62).  The IUCN then took the lead in 
drafting the first international policy on biodiversity when their research revealed that the 
cross-border trading in certain species’ was a key factor in them becoming endangered. 
The 1973 Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) 
restricts the trading of goods derived from flora or fauna identified as being at risk of 
extinction, such as ivory and certain furs. 80 states became party to this Convention 
when it came into force in 1975 and by 2010 it had 175 parties- including all major 
industrialized states- and featured laws criminalizing the trade in around 30,000 species. 
 
A regime specific to the conservation of whales can also be dated back to the 1940s but, 
similarly, did not become legally significant until several decades later. The International 
Whaling Commission (IWC) was set up in 1946, through concerns at the likely 
extinction of certain species due to hunting, but was very much anthropocentric as it was 
guided by the desire of whaling states to continue their practises in a sustainable manner. 
From the 1970s, however, the nature of the IWC was swept by the ecocentric tide as 
many states abandoned whaling in the face of concerted pressure group campaigning.  
Hence in 1986 the IWC framed a Moratorium which outlawed the hunting of all whale 
species apart from for scientific purposes. However, Norway and Iceland have not 
signed up to the moratorium and have continued commercial whaling activities, whilst 
Japan’s claims that they are continuing the practise for purely scientific purposes are 





Soon after the upsurge of political interest in environmentalism prompted by Silent 
Spring it became apparent that, like biodiversity, pollution had international 
ramifications and could not be dealt with by domestic policy alone. Most notably, the 
phenomenon of acid rain came to be understood and older issues such as oil pollution 
by tankards came to command far greater prominence. 
 
Acid rain became a contentious issue in the 1960s, not only through the emergence of 
evidence that rainwater could become contaminated and the effects of this on ground 
water and wildlife, but also because it was a problem in some states that could not be 
resolved by that state’s government. Sulphur dioxide and other emissions from the 
burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas) which accumulate in the Earth’s 
atmosphere can return to the surface as precipitation, hundreds of miles from where they 
departed as waste fumes. Hence countries particularly suffering from this phenomenon, 
such as Sweden, Norway and Canada found that they could not resolve the problem 
since the root cause of it lay in other sovereign states. This form of transboundary 
pollution most graphically demonstrated the need for international cooperation to 
resolve certain environmental issues, which was already obvious in the case of states 




















In 1979 the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) agreement was signed 
up to by the US, Canada and most western European states, establishing cuts across the 
board in sulphur dioxide and other industrial emissions. That it was not until over a 
decade since the problem had become apparent that this modest agreement between 
friendly states emerged  is testimony to the challenges presented by environmental 
problems to those traditional determinants of government policy: sovereignty, self-
sufficiency, the national interest and economic growth. The 1970s also saw the rise of 
international cooperation on curbing pollution between states sharing common stretches 
of water. A series of ‘Regional Sea Programmes’ emerged, such as the Mediterranean 
Action Plan and North Sea Convention. 
 




The 1967 Torey Canyon disaster, when an oil tanker was wrecked and spilled its load 
off the coast of the UK’s Scilly Isles, was also influential in stimulating awareness of 
and an international political response to oil pollution. This was far from the first of 
such disasters but it was the biggest to date and received huge media attention with 
telegenic images of blackened birds and beaches fuelling the mood of public protest 
that was transforming domestic politics in Europe and North America. International 
political action soon followed and in 1973 the first International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) was drafted, which for the first time set 
standards aiming to prevent accidents and criminalize the deliberate discharge of oil and 
other pollutants from ships on the high seas which had been a recognized problem for 
several years. It took a spate of further tanker accidents in the late 1970s, however, for 
MARPOL to eventually receive enough ratifications to enter into force in 1983. 
 
Case study box  The Polluter’s Dilemma: a hypothetical case study 
 Four states share a common sea and for many decades have deposited waste materials 
in the sea without political restriction. However, pollution levels in the sea have now 
reached levels that are affecting fish stocks and tourism on the coast so the four 
governments convene a conference to discuss the possibility of a coordinated 
response. 
 
The costs of pollution to each state’s income and the costs of enacting restrictions on 
pollution are represented below. 
 
         STATE           COST OF POLLUTION       COST OF CURBING POLLUTION 
 A  $2 million per year $1 million 
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B  $2 million per year $3 million 
 C  $4 million per year $12 million 
 D  $5 million per year     $10 million 
 
What policy is in the best interest of each state?   
 
For State A the decision is clear. Curbing pollution makes economic sense with a net 
benefit arising within a year of action. For State B, also, a net benefit is likely soon 
enough for this to make political sense. Such gains are, however, contingent on all 
states enacting the reforms so States A and B must also rely on States C and D 
following suit. For these two states, and particularly State C, the costs of curbing 
pollution outweigh the costs incurred for several years and possibly beyond the 
lifespan of their governments term’s in office. Although there is a gain to be made in 
the long term the decision is more difficult because, as well as imposing short-term 
and unpopular costs, there is the nagging fear that acting on this might not even work 
since another state may not also implement the cuts. States A and B also share this 
dilemma- the polluters dilemma- since, although their cost-benefit analyses are more 
straightforward, their fear of State’s C or D not acting is higher. Any one of the states 
may conclude that it is worth carrying on polluting and enjoy the benefits of an 
overall reduction in pollution through relying on the others to enact cuts- the free-
rider problem.  
 
Ultimately, coordinated action is in the interests of all but short-termism and a lack of 
trust in other states makes it difficult to guarantee that states’ will choose this option- 




Stop and think reflection 
Many criticized the US Bush adminstration’s position on environmental policies such 
as global warming but it is also worth reflecting on the fact that reducing CO2 
emissions (the key international policy in this area) would, in many ways, be an 
unpopular move domestically. What sort of pressures not to act do you imagine any 




A global version of the collective goods problem emerged in the late 1960s with the 
crystallization of the notion that sovereign control over the common ‘goods’ of water, air 
and natural resources was unsustainable. In 1968 the ecologist Garret Hardin used as a 
parable a warning first aired in the nineteenth century by the economist William Foster-
Lloyd on the finite quality of shared resources, known as the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’. 
Foster-Lloyd described how the traditional English village green, conventionally open to 
all villagers, had become endangered because of an abuse of privilege by the villagers in  
overgrazing their cattle. As the practise had gone on for centuries it had been assumed 
that it always could but it had emerged that an increase in the number of cattle above an 
optimum level was eroding the land and ruining the common resource for all. Hardin 
argued that the village green was analogous to global commons such as clean air, 
freshwater and high seas fish stocks, endangered by states continuing to exploit or 
pollute them oblivious to the fact that the cumulative effect of this would eventually be 
their depletion. ‘Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his 
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own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons’ (Hardin 
1968: 1244). Hardin’s solution to the problem was population control. ‘The only way we 
can preserve and nurture other and more precious freedoms is by relinquishing the 
freedom to breed’ (ibid: 1248). 
 
Global population control became a major international political concern in the late 
1960s and early ‘70s, more through anthropocentric fear in the North than compassion 
for the South or ecocentricism. Another analogy which later came to be popularised 
by Hardin, likened global overpopulation to a situation where there are insufficient 
lifeboats in the sea after a shipping disaster. Hardin’s thesis argued for the application 
of ‘lifeboat ethics’ to combat this, which essentially posited that international action 
to tackle famine was folly as wealthy countries would risk sinking their own 
‘lifeboats’ in doing so. Better to let the overcrowded ‘lifeboats’ of the Third World 
sink than ensuring everyone drowns (Hardin 1996).  
 
Such apocalyptic views of the global implications of overpopulation were nothing 
new and can actually be traced back as far as the eighteenth century and the works of 
British economist Thomas Malthus, who warned that the Earth’s food resources were 
likely to soon be insufficient to support its population. Malthus’ doomsday scenario 
never came to pass since the industrial revolution increased humanity’s capacity to 
utilize resources and feed itself. The fears of neo-Malthusians- like Hardin- were also 
somewhat averted by the Green Revolution which greatly increased food production 
in the Global South through the utilization of intensive agricultural technology and 
techniques (such as the use of organochlorine pesticides).  The demand for food has 
continued to rise in the less developed world and natural disasters continue to blight 
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many of the same countries, creating food shortages, but most contemporary analysts 
of famine emphasize distributive factors in their explanations of particular cases. 
Modern governments can insure against future crop shortages by stockpiling reserves 
of food and protecting the price of agricultural products (Sen 1981).  
 
The UN established a programme specifically to encourage population control in 
1969, the Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) and a first in a series of UN 
intergovernmental conference on population took place in Bucharest in 1974. 
International political action on population control lessened in prominence from the 
1980s, however, when it had become apparent to some Northern governments that 
growth in the South did not greatly affect their countries and through concerns in civil 
society and some governments that promoting birth control in Global south countries 
could have human rights implications by encouraging abortions, sterilizations and 
compromising women’s reproductive freedom. To some the neo-Malthusians, and 
environmentalists in general, came to be seen as overly pessimistic doomsayers who 
failed to appreciate humanity’s ingenuity in surmounting problems. The 
Cornucopians, led by US economist Julian Simon, reasoned that technical innovation 
had already improved the food supply, allowing it to meet a rising demand, but also 
that such a supply and demand rationale was outdated.  Rather than a drain on 
resources, people in a modern service and consumer based economy were actually a 
resource themselves (Simon 1981).  
 
 A separate strand of neo-Malthusian thinking associated with the Tragedy of the 
Commons that emerged in the 1970s was the popularization of the ‘limits to growth’ 
thesis which argued that increases in industrial production and economic growth in 
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developed countries would have to be checked.  A major report commissioned in 1972 
by the Club of Rome, a thinktank of scientists, businessmen and politicians, warned that 
“..the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next one 
hundred years” (Meadows, Meadows, Randers & Behrens 1972: 23). This warning 
gathered credence with the recognition that oil supplies were finite and greatly 
influenced political developments over the following decade. Whilst anxieties over 
population growth generally receded in international politics concerns over the depletion 
of certain key resources have persisted ever since. 
 
The emergence of International Environmental Policy 
The arrival of environmental politics on the international stage was confirmed by the 
convening of the ‘Biosphere Conference’, focussing on resource conservation, by 
UNESCO in 1968. Representatives of 60 states were present at the conference in 
Paris, including delegates of Cold War adversaries the US and Soviet Union. 
Although a barely remembered footnote in diplomatic history, the Biosphere 
Conference initiated two phenomena central to the progress of international 
environmental politics since then. Firstly; the event was organized through 
collaboration between several groups from within the UN system and civil society.  
Representatives of the UN’s World Health Organization (WHO) and Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO) attended alongside UNESCO staff and the event 
was chaired and hosted by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and 
attended by several pressure groups and prominent individual activists. This UN-civil 
society collaboration has been a central feature of the International Relations of the 
environment ever since. A second and related legacy of the Biosphere Conference 
was the idea of improving understanding of complex environmental problems by 
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building a transnational network of experts, an epistemic community, who can share 
information and seek to reach a consensus. Given the lack of scientific certainty on 
many environmental issues trying to get some sort of consensus is necessary to 
prevent governments using maverick scientific opinions to support non action and 
take the easy option in the polluters dilemma. 
 
The Stockholm Conference 
The Biosphere Conference’s most important legacy of was to pave the way for a 
bigger UN summit four years later; the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment 
(UNCHE) at Stockholm. The Conference was boycotted by the USSR and its Eastern 
Bloc allies, over a row about the failure of Western states to recognize East Germany, 
but was attended by representatives of 113 states from across the world. The 
Stockholm Conference did not produce a new body of international law at a stroke but 
served to build consensus by getting agreement on several key principles of 
environmental governance which challenged conventional notions of state 
sovereignty. Amongst the Stockholm Conference’s most significant legacies were the 
following outcomes: 
• ‘Principle 21’ confirmed that states retained full sovereign authority over 
resources located in their own territory but charged them with the 
responsibility to exploit them with due regard to the environmental effect of 
this on other states.  
• The concept of a ‘common heritage of mankind’ was agreed whereby 
resources located outside of territorial borders (such as minerals on the bed of 
the High Seas) should be considered as belonging to the international 
community collectively. 
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• The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) was created, to 
nurture and institutionalise epistemic communities. 
•  Establishing environmental questions firmly on the political agenda by 
prompting many governments to create new ministers and departments of the 
Environment and greatly deepening and widening a global network of 
environmental pressure groups. 
 
UNEP became an important focus for epistemic communities on a range of 
environmental issues and assumed responsibility for the stewardship of regimes for 
common seas, such as the Mediterranean and the North Sea. The common heritage of 
mankind principle became more established, at least in the Western world, but did not 
fully displace the notion of sovereign control over resources. In political practise both 
sides of Principle 21 have been enacted and two very different solutions to the Tragedy 
of the Commons parable have been attempted. Firstly, you can have a Liberal 
solution: informed collective management to regulate use of the ‘village green’ for 
the benefit of all. Secondly, in a more Realist solution, you can abandon the idea of 
common land and divide the ‘green’ up into individual holdings in the expectation 
that each plot holder would graze sustainably. Both types of solutions are evident in 
the development in the 1970 and 80s of international law for a ‘commons’ already 
subject to many centuries of contention, the high seas (seas outside of any state’s 
jurisdiction). The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 
III), which concluded in 1982, included an agreement that minerals on the bed of the 
High Sea would be the property of a new International Seabed Authority. This form of 
collective management to sustain collective goods can, however, be contrasted with the 
encroachment on the tradition of the ‘freedom of the seas’ by the huge growth of waters 
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claimed by states in the legitimization at UNCLOS III of 200 mile ‘Exclusive Economic 
Zones (EEZs)’.  An EEZ does not denote the full sovereign control of territorial waters 
(12 miles from the coast) but gives the state concerned primary rights over fishing and 
mineral exploitation in the zone. The rationale offered for the creation of EEZs was that 
fish stocks and other resources would be utilized more sustainably if under sovereign 
jurisdiction rather than subject to a ‘free for all’.  A tension between the ‘freedom of the 
seas’ and sovereign management persist and looks set to become more acute in 
forthcoming years as a number of states look to extend the EEZ principle to continental 
shelves beyond 200 miles of their coastlines. The recent spate of claims over the Arctic 
Ocean, where oil and mineral prospecting has become more practical due to the 
declining ice sheet, by Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark, is a case in point. 
 
 
The Globalization of Political Ecology 
 
Throughout the 1970s and early ‘80s international environmental policy deepened but 
did not significantly widen. States, principally from the developed capitalist world, 
became party to numerous new international regimes as well as developing existing 
legal instruments in the areas of conservation, pollution and resource management. 
Changes in both the physical and political climate, however, came to bring the First, 
Second and Third World’s closer together and globalize environmental politics from the 
1980s.  
 
Although transboundary pollution and the management of the global commons were, by 
the 1980s, firmly on the international political agenda, the majority of the harmful 
 18
effects of environmental change were viewed as localized problems and as such were of 
little concern to the wider international community. Domestic legislation in the 
developed world had banned the use of notoriously polluting chemicals like DDT and 
curbed the excesses of industrial emissions and waste disposal, leading to visible 
improvements in atmospheric quality and animal conservation. However, the emergence 
of evidence that seemingly remote problems, experienced primarily in the Global South, 
had wider repercussions served to reframe some environmental issues and bring others 
to global political prominence.   
 
Deforestation- the progressive decline in tree numbers- seen for a number of years as a 
problem for forest-dwellers, human and otherwise, came to be cast in new light by the 
discovery in the 1980s of the ‘carbon-sink effect’, the fact that trees absorb atmospheric 
carbon dioxide. Carbon dioxide in the atmosphere contributes to global warming and 
above a certain level is poisonous to man. It has been estimated that the loss of trees in 
the world contributes more to global warming than the more frequently cited impact of 
transport (Stern 2006). The realization that the net loss of tropical rainforest could, 
ultimately, harm North American and European urban residents as well as Amazonian 
Amerindians helped bring this issue to the global political agenda. Additionally, the 
increased economic globalization of the world can bring external environmental 
problems into the domestic arena. Harmful organochlorine insecticides may have been 
virtually eliminated from use in developed countries by the 1980s but their continued 
use, promoted by Multi-National Corporations from the global North, deprived of a 
domestic market, was seeing them return to their places of origin in imported foodstuffs 
in a ‘Circle of Poison’ effect (Weir & Schapiro 1981).    
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As well as seeing some environmental issues from a wider perspective, in the 1980s it 
began to become apparent that globalization in general was transforming all 
environmental issues. The vast majority of environmental problems are related in some 
way to the processes of economic development and growth, which have dominated how 
governments frame their policies both domestically and in the global marketplace. 
Industrialization and urbanization, the classic ingredients of development, put extra 
strain on a country’s resources, whilst changing its pattern of land use and altering the 
balance between the human and natural environment. Increased industrial and 
agricultural production invariably brings more pollution as well as more raw materials, 
food and wealth. At the Stockholm Conference Indian premier Indira Ghandi signalled 
that the global South would not compromise economic development for the sake of the 
environment since ‘poverty is the worst pollution’. The fundamental paradox of how to 
reconcile economic growth with environmental concerns was apparent at Stockholm 
but, by the 1980s, could no longer be ignored. By then it had become clear that global 
environmental policy was being stymied because, although the developed world was 
coming to terms (albeit partially) with the need to put some limits on industrial 
‘progress’, the Global South would not compromise economic development since the 
stakes were so much higher.  
 
Sustainable Development 
In an effort to get around the economic - environmental paradox, the UN General 
Assembly in 1987 authorized the establishment of a World Commission on 
Environment and Development (WCED).  Chaired by Norwegian Prime Minister Gro 
Harlem Brundtland, the WCED produced the report ‘Our Common Future’, 
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identifying sustainable development as the solution.  Sustainable development 
reconciled environmental and economic interests by framing them as interdependent. 
The Global North would have to take the lead in implementing costly anti-pollution 
measures and recognize that the South would need more time to follow suit. To the 
South this was only fair since the North was responsible for most global pollution and 
had been able to develop without constraints being put on their industrialization. To 
the North this was a price worth paying as it was the only way to win support from 
developing countries like China and India who would eventually come to be major 
global polluters also.  
 
Sustainable development is less pessimistic than the ‘Limits to Growth’ thesis, which 
was prominent in environmental thinking in the 1970s, in that it does not consider 
economic growth to be anathema to avoiding pollution and the depletion of the 
Earth’s resources. Economic growth, even for wealthy states, can be acceptable so 
long as it is at a level that can be sustained in the long run and not at the cost of 
degrading the environment. Hence sustainable development is less obviously 
contradictory to the national interest instinct as it merely calls upon governments to be 
more rationally long-termist in their economic policy. The message is that rapid 
economic growth today may enrich the present generation but risk impoverishing or 
endangering future generations if resources are not utilized in a sustainable and 
responsible manner.  
 
The Rio Summit 
The Our Common Future report prompted the UN General Assembly in 1989 to 
approve a conference as a twenty year follow up to Stockholm to flesh out the concept 
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of sustainable development. As the title indicates, the 1992 UN Conference on the 
Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio De Janeiro, recognized the 
need to couple together the two issue areas and was a much larger and more diverse 
gathering than in 1972. 170 states were represented, most at some stage by their head 
of government, and some 1,400 pressure groups were also present at the myriad 
formal and informal meetings that characterized the Conference. In contrast, at 
Stockholm only two heads of government and 134 pressure groups had attended.  
Although decision-making authority was reserved for government delegates the 
pressure groups at Rio played a pivotal role in organizing the event and in the 
extensive lobbying of the decision-makers.  
 
Amongst twenty seven general principles agreed to in the ‘Rio Declaration’ at the 
summit were two particularly important points of consensus which served to clarify 
the meaning of sustainable development. 
• Principle 7 identified the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ of 
developed and less-developed states in environmental protection. The Global 
South were to be part of the process but the North would have to take the lead 
and incur most of the initial costs.  
• Principle 15 acknowledged the legitimacy of the ‘precautionary principle’ in 
developing environmental policy. This proposes that a lack of absolute 
scientific certainty over the harmful side-effects of some form of economic 
activity widely believed to be environmentally damaging, should not be used 
as an excuse to continue with it. This was an important agreement because 
issues of environmental change tend to be complex and subject to some level 
of scientific disagreement. In the face of this, excuses can more readily be 
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found for ignoring environmental demands and choosing the short-term option 
in polluter’s dilemma scenarios. 
.  
Like Stockholm, the Rio Summit did not instantly create international law but, unlike 
its predecessor, it did explicitly set the signatory governments on a legislatory path. 
‘Agenda 21’ of UNCED set out a programme of action for implementing sustainable 
development across a range of environmental issues, including issues debated in 
recent years but not yet subject to conventions, such as biodiversity, global warming, 
deforestation and desertification. A Commission for Sustainable Development was 
established to regularly review progress towards establishing and implementing the 
conventions that were to follow. In addition, a crucial tenet of sustainable 
development was realized in the creation of the Global Environmental Facility, a fund 
subsidized by developed countries, from which Less Developed Countries could draw 
in order to be able to implement agreements. Four specific regimes were initiated at 
Rio: 
 
• The UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) entered into force in 
1993 and went far beyond the previous most significant regime in this area, 
the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species, by 
committing the parties to biannual conferences at which their progress in 
conserving biological diversity in their countries is opened to scrutiny.  
 
• The Forest Principles agreement emerged when negotiations to establish a 
deforestation convention failed due to the reluctance of states with prominent 
logging industries, like Brazil and Malaysia, to sanction significant restraints 
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on their trade. In its place what emerged instead was a weak, non legally-
binding regime which, whilst proclaiming the virtues of sustainable forestry 
management, in effect gives the green light to states to continue deforesting by 
asserting that forests are sovereign resources. A short-termist and selfish 
response to the collective goods problem had occurred. Effectively regulating 
deforestation was too much of an economic burden for most prolific ‘logging’ 
states to countenance and, despite knowledge of the ‘carbon sink effect’, this 
was still not seen as sufficiently threatening to the Global North for their 
governments to push harder for action. 
 
• The Convention to Combat Desertification was a response to the most 
visible manifestation of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ effect in the world over 
recent years whereby deserts have grown in size at the expense of fertile lands 
surrounding them. Once land becomes arid in this way it is effectively lost 
forever in terms of its productive value and so can have food security 
implications for the local population and, to a limited extent, humanity at 
large. The convention, established in 1994, sets out a code of practise for the 
management of semi-arid lands. The convention was unusual in global 
environmental politics in that it was prompted by developing rather than the 
industrialized states.  It was principally African states, affected by the spread 
of the Sahara and Kalahari deserts, who championed the inclusion of this issue 
in Article 21. The regime has evolved slowly since 1994 and, although it is 
now virtually global in scope, it lacks any of the legal rigour of its other 
environmental regimes that have subsequently emerged. The effects of 
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desertification remain more localized than global and the level of political 
commitment has followed suit. 
 
• The Framework Convention on Climate Change (IFCCC) emerged 
following a build up of concern at the implications of worldwide rises in 
temperature. An epistemic community had for a few years been voicing fears 
that global warming was not natural and a potential danger but without any 
conclusive scientific certainty. However, In the spirit of the precautionary 
principle, the IFCC was signed at Rio and entered into force two years later. 
The Convention at this stage, however, was also a limited, non-binding 
agreement without any explicit commitments imposed on states. 
 
 
Global Environmental Policy and Human Security 
 
Sustainable development and the end of the Cold War brought the world more 
together intellectually and politically and served to globalize environmental politics 
but it was a reactivation of anthropocentric values from the mid 1980s that did most to 
push some of those environmental issues further up the international political agenda- 
‘securitizing’ them- through the fear that certain aspects of environmental change 
could be life-threatening. Environmental changes which have human health 




Hard epistemic community evidence was able to prompt perhaps the most successful 
international policy on the environment some five years before the Rio Summit. In 
1985 the British Antarctic Survey were able to prove conclusively what had been 
suspected by scientists for at least a decade, that the Earth’s ozone layer had a hole in 
it. The ozone layer is a protective gaseous shell in the upper atmosphere which 
absorbs ultraviolet rays from the sun before they reach the Earth’s surface, which is 
vital since such radiation can kill in the form of skin cancer and other ailments. 
 
The clear danger posed by the loss of this defensive shield prompted an unusually 
rapid international response. Within a few months of the British Antarctic Survey 
discovery the Vienna Convention on Protection of the Ozone Layer established a 
framework treaty, fleshed out two years later in the 1987 Montreal Protocol on 
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer. The 1987 Montreal Protocol saw twenty 
four industrialized states bind themselves to an agreement for major cuts in the future 
use and emission of chlor-fluro-carbons (CFCs) and some other chemicals known to 
be agents of ozone depletion. In the years since 1987 the regime has been 
strengthened in a series of amendments deepening the cuts to be made by states and 
widening its application to most of the world. This was achieved by the application of 
key sustainable development principles agreed on at Rio with developing countries 
allowed to take a slower track towards phasing out CFCs than the developed states 
and a multilateral fund created to overcome the costs of implementing the agreements. 
The success of the regime can be proven by evidence that, within twenty years, the 




The clearest case of how environmental change can become an issue of human 
security is in the threat posed by global warming. The Earth’s average temperature 
has risen consistently over the last century and it is now almost universally accepted 
that this is more than a natural development and likely to accelerate if not dealt with. 
The central cause of global warming is an exacerbation of the natural phenomenon of 
the ‘greenhouse effect’, caused by increased industrial emissions. Increased releases 
of carbon dioxide and methane over the years, principally through the burning of 
fossil fuels, have served to exaggerate the natural tendency of the atmosphere to trap a 
certain amount of infrared sunlight after it is reflected from the Earth’s surface. There 












A rise in appreciation of such threats, and recognition that the IFCC was inadequate 
as a means of countering them, prompted a significant revamp of the convention in 
the form of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol enacted the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities by requiring developed countries to cut 
emissions of greenhouse gasses by 5.2% from 1990 levels by 2012 without any initial 
commitment from developing countries. Penalties for non-compliance are also 
included in the regime along with an imaginative means of meeting overall targets 
through ‘carbon trading’. This idea, initiated in the US in the 1970s, as part of the 
Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) regime, provides a market 
mechanism to get round the collective goods problem. Countries exceeding their 
emissions target can pay countries below their target to acquire their ‘carbon credits’. 
 
box 23.3 human security threats from climate change 
 
The implications of climate change are various but include increased 
desertification and a raising of sea levels due to the polar ice caps melting, both 
carrying significant threats to human life in the following forms: 
• More frequent and lengthy heat waves 
• More frequent droughts 
• Coastal flooding due to sea level rises 
• Reduced crop yields due to reduced rainfall 
• Spread of tropical diseases north and south 
• Increased rate of water-borne diseases in flooded areas 
• Ocean acidification due to carbon dioxide effecting fish stocks 
• More frequent and stronger riverine flooding in wet seasons due to glaciers 
melting / reduced water supply in dry season. 
• Increased incidences of wildfires 
• More frequent and stronger windstorms 
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Although scientific uncertainties inevitably still exist over an issue as complex as 
climate change a definitive epistemic consensus has gradually emerged from the UN’s 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, since its establishment in 1988. By their 
fourth report in 2007 this substantial grouping of the world’s top climatologists were 
able to pronounce, in the cautious words of science, that it was between 90 and 95% 
certain that global warming was caused by human action (IPCC 2007). Climate 
change presents the quintessential polluter’s dilemma with significant costs inherent 
in political action but with potentially the most profound of consequences of inaction. 
Costing such an issue must inevitably be somewhat sketchy but the 2006 ‘Stern 
Review’, compiled by a British economist on behalf of the UK government, 
calculated the cost of non-action on climate change as amounting to at the very least 5 
% of global GDP for evermore. Set against this, the costs of effective action to curb 
climate change would cost around 1% of global GDP per year (Stern 2006).   
 
Global warming is a global problem, in both cause and effect, but the scale of human 
security threat is not equal across the globe. As illustrated in the opening box, for low-
lying island states the prospect of a rise in the level of the Oceans is a threat of the 
utmost gravity. For other states the threat is seen as far more remote, both 
geographically and chronologically, and the urgency to act, which is generally needed 
for governments to ratify costly environmental agreements, is not there.  Indeed, it 
should be noted that the Stern Review was very much a cost-benefit analysis and, 
whilst noting that globally the balance is undoubtedly weighted in favour of the 
former, it makes clear that some parts of the world could experience net gains from 
fewer cold related deaths, the increased revenue from tourism and improved 
agricultural fertility. It is also apparent that some of the threats associated with global 
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warming could be averted by human adaptation to a changing landscape (for example 
by migration), a point Cornucopians like Julian Simon have made in the face of 
another prophecy of environmental catastrophe like overpopulation in the 1960s and 
70s (Simon 1999). 
 
The threat posed by global warming, however, is increasingly thought not just to be a 
theoretical future scenario. The human cost is already significant and is not just 
confined to the developing world, where other factors can more easily be employed to 
explain mortality figures. The World Health Organization has estimated an annual 
death toll of 150,000 due to global warming since the 1970s (McMichael et al 2004).  
Most of these casualties are from the Global South but the North has been rocked by 
events such as the 2003 heatwave in Western Europe which killed up to 35,000 
people and Hurricane Katrina, the following year, which claimed around 1,200 lives 
and caused an estimated $200 billion worth of damage in the US. Whilst proving 
categorically whether such single events are attributable to global warming is 
impossible, the changes associated with climate change are already occurring and a 





















Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) 
The 1992 Rio Summit was also the catalyst for significant global political action in the 
area of human health-threatening atmospheric pollution. UNEP’s Governing Council in 
1997 endorsed the opinion of the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety, which 
had been established at the Rio Summit, that a binding treaty be set up to phase out the 
production and use of thirteen POPs (initially a ‘dirty dozen’) including DDT and 
several other organochlorine pesticides across the world. The Treaty was signed by 127 
governments at a Diplomatic Conference in Stockholm in 2001, initiating a regime that 
will continue to consider adding new chemicals to the original thirteen through a Review 
Committee. The production and use of the thirteen outlawed chemicals had long ceased 
in most developed countries but their properties ensured that they remained a domestic 
hazard to those populations. The listed chemicals are all highly persistent, have a 
propensity to travel globally in the atmosphere through a continual process of 
evaporation and deposition and frequently end up in human foodstuffs through the 
box 23.4 Bjorn Lomborg- The Sceptical Environmentalist 
Lomborg’s 2001 work ‘The Sceptical Environmentalist’ attracted great interest (and 
great derision from Ecologists) for questioning whether implementing international 
policy on global warming made any rational sense. The Danish academic claims 
that he was converted to a sceptical view of the Kyoto Protocol and other 
international environmental policies he had previously supported by an exercize in 
one of his classes at the University of Aarhus in which he asked his students to 
consider the most efficient way to allocate money to solve the most pressing global 
problems.  The students’ results and Lomborg’s subsequent research suggested that, 
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process of bioaccumulation. Hence, sterility, neural disorders and cancer in peoples of 
the developed world can be attributed to the use of POPs in other parts of the planet. The 
political significance of this is such that even President George W Bush, already known 
in some quarters as the ‘Toxic Texan’ for his administrations lack of enthusiasm for 
environmental concerns, declared the USA to be a firm supporter of international 
political action on POPs. 
 
 
box 23.5  Chemicals subject to the Stockholm Convention 
Intentionally produced   
Aldrin Pesticide  
 
 
use and production banned apart from 





Hexachlorobenzene (HCB) Pesticide 
Mirex Pesticide 
Toxaphene Pesticide 
Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Industrial Chemical 
dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane 
(DDT) 
Pesticide use restricted to disease vector control 
unintentionally produced   
Polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins and 
dibenzofurans (PCDD ‘dioxins’ / 
PCDF ‘furans’) 
 use and production minimized with aim 
of elimination 
Hexachlorobenzene (HCB) Pesticide 





Aside from the POPs ‘dirty dozen’, pollution in general still represents a major threat to 
human life. It has been estimated that between a quarter and a third of all deaths in the 
world by disease have environmental causes, such as air and water pollution (Smith, 
Corvalan & Kiellstrom 1999: 573). Developed countries have long been aware of the 
human cost of pollution, as can be evidenced by the UK Clean Air Act of 1956 that 
followed in the wake of the Great Smog four years previously that had claimed the lives 
of around 4,000 Londoners. Over time, however, recognition has grown than national 
actions alone are not enough. 
 
Natural Disasters  
Natural disasters are often caused by human-induced environmental change.  
Deforestation exacerbates global warming and can be seen as a causal factor behind 
natural disasters such as mudslides down once naturally secure hillsides (Humphreys 
2006: 1). Human vulnerability to natural hazards has increased in recent years due 
principally to population growth and movement in the global South. Natural disasters 
also often occur for rational, natural reasons related to environmental change. 
Tropical cyclones, for example, can be understood as ‘safety valves’ which dissipate 
the build up of excessive heat in the ocean or atmosphere. This has led some 
climatologists to suggest that the increased prominence of the El Nino effect in the 
1990s, associated with more frequent cyclones and other extreme weather 
phenomena, could be linked to global warming (Mazza 1998, Trenberth 1998). The 
2003 European heatwave, unprecedented in history, provided even clearer evidence of 




Other issues of environmental change have come to be framed in more human 
security terms. In 2008 the Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), a 
thinktank funded by the EU and German government, replicated the Stern Report on a 
classically ecocentric issue somewhat put in the shade by the politics of climate 
change. The TEEB review posited that global GDP would be likely to decline by 7% 
by 2050 if greater commitment to preserving fish stocks, forests and other species 
needed by humanity was not given (Sukhdev 2008). Released against a backdrop of 




Threats to the Global Consensus on Environmental Policy 
 
The widening and deepening of international environmental policy in the 1980s and 
1990s hit something of a crossroads in the new millennium with some erosion of the 
global consensus that had been carefully forged. The First and Third World had been 
reconciled by the concept of sustainable development and the First and Second 
Worlds merged together by changing political circumstances but it was a division 
within the ranks of the First World that came to threaten global solidarity. The United 
States under George W. Bush charted a new course in relation to global 
environmental policy, marked by a return to a more individualistic foreign policy with 
a non-collective strategy towards polluter’s dilemma situations.  
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The US from 2001 backtracked on several commitments to principles and policies 
accepted by the Clinton administration at Rio. Most notably the Bush government 
broke ranks and failed to ratify the Kyoto protocol despite the US having signed the 
framework treaty under Clinton. The US government sidestepped the precautionary 
principle and common but differentiated responsibilities concept by citing the lack of 
scientific certainty over human induced global warming and concerns over the lesser 
constraints imposed on developing countries. In addition they also admitted that the 
treaty was simply not in their ‘national interest’ because of the economic cost. 
Similarly, the US delegation at the negotiations of the Stockholm POPS Convention 
fought hard to ensure that the term ‘precautionary principle’ did not appear in the final 
text and it was eventually replaced with the more ambiguous compromise phrase 
‘precautionary approach’, which the industrialists hoped would open the door to less 
expansive ‘scientific’ toxicity assessments for future chemicals to be subject to the 
regime (Olsen 2003: 99-100). The significance of such semantics is clear from 
considering the Bush administration’s pronouncements on the principle accepted by the 
US government at UNCED; “the US government supports precautionary approaches to 
risk management but we do not recognize any precautionary principle” (Graham 2002). 
By 2010 the US had still not ratified Stockholm with the Bush administration’s initial 
enthusiasm curbed by the inclusion of chemicals on the ‘POPs list’ still used extensively 
by the US chlorine industry.  
 
The exasperation of the international community at the new US strategy became 
evident at the ten year follow-up to Rio, the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002. The conference is best remembered 
for the widespread booing and heckling which greeted the addresses of US Secretary 
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of State Colin Powell, who had been sent to Johannesburg in place of his President, 
mindful of the hostile reception he would receive. Johannesburg represented the third 
environmental ‘mega-conference’ but was more low-key than its predecessor. It was 
also noticeably more anthropocentric and more focussed on development than the 
environment. Little progress was made in advancing the agenda on biodiversity 
established at Rio and, although global warming policy was kept alive, it was not 
developed in any significant way. New proposals to set a framework for phasing in 
the use of renewable energy sources and improving Global South access to developed 
world food markets were side-stepped but some new goals were set in line with the 
recently-agreed upon Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (see chapter 18). 2015 
was set as a target date for the realization of two new human security aims: halving 
the number of people who lack access to clean water and achieving sustainability in 
global fishing.    
 
Despite US obstruction global environmental politics in the 21st Century has 
continued to evolve and served to demonstrate the limitations of hegemonic power 
politics in the contemporary world. Fellow recalcitrant states, like Russia and 
Australia, were gradually converted to the Kyoto Protocol through pressure by the 
society of states and non-state actors. Epistemic consensus and global civil society 
have given such momentum to global environmental politics that it can survive being 
pushed off the international agenda by displays of national interest against the 
common good. That the US were out of step with the world became clear when their 
spokesmen were again booed and, most noticeably, yelled at to ‘get out of the way’ 




By 2009 under a new President the US had been brought partly back into the fold and 
at a Copenhagen Summit (the 15th Conference of the Parties of the International 
Framework Convention on Climate Change) signalled acceptance of both the 
precautionary and common but differentiated responsibilities principles by agreeing to 
Carbon dioxide cuts and contributing to a global fund for assisting developing states 





Global political action on the natural environmental has seen many issues politicized and 
put on the international agenda but only a few securitized at the top of that agenda.  
Myriad international regimes have emerged since the high water mark of environmental 
politics at Rio in 1992 but global policy today stands in stark contrast to domestic 
environmental laws in Western European and North American states which are marked 
by precautionary consumer standards and ecocentric measures. Where successful 
international environmental regimes have emerged it has usually been where a clear and 
unambiguous human health threat is apparent. It is far rarer for the value of 
environmental protection to be prioritized at the global level than it is at the domestic 
level. Internationally, governments are still prone to taking blinkered decisions informed 
by short-term economic interest in the face of epistemic consensus and longer term 
utilitarian calculations of ‘national interest’, as has most clearly been seen in the US’s 
stance on climate change under the Bush government. From the perspective of 
governments worrying about an apparently imminent terrorist threat, economic 
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downturn or their next election global environmental issues often do not get placed 
near the top of their political ‘in trays’. 
  
In the face of this the short-term and easier response is to play the polluter in the 
polluter’s dilemma. The scale of the threat posed by environmental change is difficult 
to quantify but it is undoubtedly significant and, to a large extent, avoidable given the 
political will. Probably the highest profile issues of environmental change, at different 
times over the past forty years, have been; resource scarcity due to population growth, 
ozone depletion and global warming. The fact that the first of these ‘crises’ never 
really materialized and the second one was partially averted by reasonably effective 
global political action has served to reinforce the notion that contemporary threats 
posed by environmental change, such as global warming, are potential rather than 
actual threats and perhaps exaggerated. As a result, despite gradually becoming more 
of a feature on the global political agenda, environmental issues still struggle to be 
treated as a political priority. The unprecedented scale of the threats posed by global 
warming and the increased appreciation of environmental principles amongst ordinary 







1. Analyze and account for the increased international political concern that has been 
given to environmental issues over the last forty years. 
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2. Why has environmental policy at the global level generally proved harder to attain 
than it has domestically in most developed states? 
 
3. Why do some people (and states) consider global warming to be an issue of critical 
importance whilst others do not? 
 
4. Explain what is meant by sustainable development and account for the rise of this 
concept in international politics. 
 
 How green are you? 
Are there any environmental issues that concern you? What is it about these issues 
that concerns you? Do you support action for economic or personal health reasons or 
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i The Nazis linked natural and racial German purity as is encapsulated in their slogan ‘blood and soil’ 
and Agriculture minister Richard Darre enacted some policies in line with this, such as the 1935 Reich 
Law for the Protection of Nature. 
